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PLACE OF TRIAL OF CIVIL CASES
EARLy ENGLISH AND MODERN FEDERAL

William Wirt Blume*

P

LACES involved in a study of place of trial may be classified
in various ways. The most general classification is: (I) Places
within one sovereignty, (2) Places in different sovereignties. Where
there is choice of place within one sovereignty, the only rational
basis for making the choice is convenience-convenience of the parties,
jurors, witnesses, and of the court itself. The same is true when the
choice is between courts of different sovereignties, but without cooperation between the sovereignties rational choice may not be possible. The purpose of this discussion is to compare choice of place in
England before 1800 with choice of place under our present system
of federal courts.

I
ENGLAND BEFORE

1800

"

A. Place of Holding the King's Courts
1.

Curia regis

Prior to the separation of the king's general court (Curia Regis)
into specialized courts (such as the King's Bench, Common Pleas,
Exchequer and Chancery) there was no fixed place at which the
general court was held. It followed the person of the king, who, in
accord with medieval custom, was travelling constantly throughout the length and breadth of his kingdom. Taking for illustration
the reign of William II (1087-II00) we find in Maddox1- that the
king held court in the following places:
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan-Ed.
1 MADoox, HxsTORY AND .ANTIQUITIES OF THE ExcHEQUER

6 (1711).
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"K. William II. ·about the beginning of his Reign, held his
Court in Christmas at London; where were present Lanfranc
Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Archbishop of York, Maurice
Bishop of London, W alchelm Bishop of Winchester, Odo Bishop
of Baieux, Justiciar and Chief Man of all England, with others.
In the Year 1094, at Christmas he held his Court at Gloucester.
In the year 1095, at Easter he held his Court at Winchester; And
in Whitsontide at Windsor; where were present all his Noblemen,
except the Earl of N othumberland. In the Year 1096, at Christmas he held his Court at Windsor. And in the Octaves of the
Epiphany, the King and all his Nobles were at Salisbury; There
- Gosfrey Bainard accused William de Ou the Kings Kinsman of
Treason (in the Kings Court), and vanquished him in single
Combat; whereupon, the King commanded William de Ou's Eyes
to be put-out, and his Testicles to be cut-off, and' his Dapifer ( one
William by name) to be hanged; and There Eoda Earl of Compania the Kings-Son in Law, was deprived of his Lands, and others
were put to Death at London, by the Kings Command (for being
concerned in the said treason). In the Year 1099, the King was
in Normandy at Christmas; At Easter he came into England; And
at Whitsontide he held his Court for the First time in the Newhall at W estminister; where he gave to Ranulf his Chaplain the
Bishoprick of Durham. And in the Year llOO, (the last Year of
his Reign), at Christmas he held his Court at Gloucester, at
Easter at Winchester; and at Whitsontide at Westminister; But
nothing memorable is mentioned to have peen done there."
Choice of the place of holding the king's court was governed by
convenience-convenience of the king and his court. Convenience of
parties and others who must attend the court seems not to have been
considered. To illustrate the hardships which resulted from the ambulatory nature of the king's court, writers commonly refer to the
case of Richard of Anesty who found it necessary in the years 11581163 to travel over most of England and onto the continent of Europe
in order to conduct a lawsuit which was pending before the court.2

2.

Excbequer

The first branch of the king's general court to -become settled
in one place was the branch later known as the Court of Exchequer.
When this occurred has been a matter of some dispute. The editors
2 I HoLDSWORTH, HIST. ENG. I.Aw, 6th eel., 34 (1938). See also McKEcHNIE,
eel., 262 (1914).

CARTA, 2d

MAGNA

1949]

PLACE OF

TRIAL

OF CIVIL CASES

3

of the Oxford edition of the Dialogue Concerning the Exchequer
(Bialogus de Scaccario) were of the opinion that the Exchequer had
not become settled at any one place by the time the Dialogue was
written (1177-1179). They say: 3
"The evidence of the Pipe Rolls on the point is only indirect,
but the following dates and places seem probable. In 1156 the
Exchequer sat at Westminister; in 1158 one Exchequer session
was held at Wocester; in l 162 one session was at Oxford; in l 164,
the Easter session was at London; the Michaelmas session of the
same year was at Northampton; in l 166 one session was at Worcester; in 1175 the Easter session was at Oxford, and the Michaelmas one at London. It is not necessary to add instances to these.
Enough has been done to show that there was no permanent
place of sitting for the Exchequer."
On the other hand, H. G. Richardson, in an introduction to a recent publication of the Pipe Roll Society,4 after pointing out that
it is only gradually that the exchequer comes to be thought of as a
"place" rather than an "occasion,"5 states: "By 1172, at latest, the
exchequer had settled down at Westminister, though the Easter session
might still occasionally be held elsewhere." 6 Poole seems to assume
that the tower window at which the author of the Dialogue was
seated when he commenced his celebrated treatise was on the east
side of Westminister Hall. 7 As stated by Richardson, · "there are
many signs that before the end of the twelfth century the exchequer
staff had taken up permanent residence in the neighborhood of the
great hall of Rufus." 8
The settlement of the court in one place _was more for the convenience of the court than for the convenience of litigants and others'
who were compelled to attend. The court's records and equipment
had become too bulky to be carted over the country in the train of
the king.
3 DLu.ocus DE SCAcCARio, edited by Arthur Hughes, C. G. Crump, and C. Johnson, 44 (1902).
4Memoranda Roll, Michaelmas Term, 1st Year of Reign of King John (1933).
5 Id. at xi.
6 Id. at xii.
7 PooLl!, THE ExcHl!QUER IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY 8 (1912). The first book of
the Dialogue opens with these words: ''In the twenty-third year of the reign of king
Henry II, while I sat at the window of the tower which is by the river Thames. • • ."
Poole adds: "on the east side of Westminister Hall." A translation of the Dialogue appears
in HmmERsoN, Sl!Ll!cr HISTORICAL DocuMENTs oF THE MroDLl! AcEs 20 (1912). See
Introduction to Select Cases in the Exchequer of Pleas, 48 SELDON Soc. cxxxvi (1931).
8 Memoranda Roll, Michaelmas Term, 1st Year of Reign of King John, p. xiii (1933).
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Common Pleas

As early as 1178 there were judges in the king's general court
who were supposed to be always present to hear complaints. 9 In John's
reign (1199-1216), some years before Magna Carta (1215), this
bench of judges, according to McKechnie, "ceased to follow the king's
movements habitually, and established itself at Westminister."10 However inconvenient it was to try all cases at W estminister, this was a
great improvement over the prior arrangement.· "It was," says McKechnie, "in 1215 considered an abuse for John to try a common plea
elsewhere."11 Magna Carta (1215) provided: "Common pleas shall
not follow our court, but shall be held in some fixed place."12 When, .
in 1234, Henry III began to hold general courts in various parts of
the county, the judges of common pleas remained at Westminister.13
This physical 'separation of · the judges of common pleas from the
remainder of the general court marks the beginning of the separate
existence of the court later known as the Court of Common Pleas.

4.

King's Bench

A statute enacted in 1300 stated that it was the king's will that
the "Chancellor and the Justices of his [ the king's] Bench" should
follow him, so he might have at all times near him "some Sages of the
Law" who might be able "duly to order all such Matters" as might
come to the court.14 Coke observed that "notwithstanding" this statute
'!both the chancery and the kings bench were at this time settled
courts during the severall terms of the year."15 If Coke's observation
· is correct, and Holdsworth seems to think that it is,1 6 the brancp. of
the king's general court later known as the Court of King's Bench
had settled down at W estminister by the end of the 1200's. According
to Spence, the court "ceased to follow the king" in the reign of Edward
III (1327-1377).11
1 HOLDSWORTH, HisT. fum. LA.w, 6th ed., 51 (1938).
MAGNA CARTA, 2d ed., 266 (1914).
11Jbid.
12 Id., c. 17, p. 261.
13 Maitland, Introduction to Select Pleas of the Crown, 1 SELDEN Soc. xviii-xix
(1887).
14 28 Edw. 1, st. 3, c. 5,
15 Cmrn, FOURTH lNsnTUTB 72.
16 1 HoLDswoRTH, HisT. ENG. LA.w, 6th ed., 206 (1938).
111 SPENCE, EQUITAllLE JurosnrcnoN oF THE CoURT oF CHANCERY 339 (1846) •
9

10 McK:ecHNIE,

.-
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Chancery

At the time of the statute mentioned in the preceding section, the
branch of the king's general court known as the chancery was looked
upon as a public board or office, and not as a court of justice. The
chancellor's court of equity was a later development. A principal
business of the chancery was the issuance of writs to enable complainants to sue in the king's courts. Referring to the location of the chancery in the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) Palgrave states:
"The officers of the Chancery lived or lodged together in ari
inn, or hospitium, which, when the king resided at Westminister,
was near the Palace, or perhaps a part of it. The writs were
sealed on the table of marble-stone which stood at the upper end
of the hall, and there they seem to have been delivered out to the
suitors. When the king travelled, he was followed by Chancellor, Masters, Clerks, and records."18
Coke's view that the chancery was a "settled" court as early as 1300
has already been noted.19 Parkes put the date a little later, stating that
the court "ceased to be ambulatory about the 4th Edward III,"20 that
is, about 1331. Spence was less specific, stating that the chancery
"ceased to follow the king" in the reign of Edward III (1327-1377). 21

6.

Itinerant justices

The hardships which Howed from the fact that the king's court
followed the person of the king, and which later Howed from the
settlement of the various branches of the court in one place, were
gradually alleviated by the practice of sending justices to hold court
in the various counties. This practice, although followed to some extent from the beginning of the Norman period, was not systematized
until 1176. In that year, at the council of Northampton, the king
(Henry II), with the advice of the council, divided the kingdom into
six circuits, appointing three justices to administer justice in each.22
According to Reeves, 23
18 PALGRAVE, ORIGINAL AuTHORITY OF THB KmG's CouNCIL 14 (1834). "On those
occasions it was usual to require a strong horse, able to carry the rolls, from some religious
house bound to furnish the animal; and at the towns where the king rested during his
progress, an Hospitium was assigned to the Chancery." Ibid.
19 CoKE, FOURTH lliSTITUTB 72.
20PARKEs, HisT. oF CotmT oF CHANCERY 34 (1828).
211 SPENCE, EQmTAJ3LE JumsDICTION OF THB CouRT OF CHANCERY 339 (1846).
22 1 HoLDSWORTH, HisT. ENG. LAW, 6th ed., 50 (1938).
23 1 REEVES, HisT. ~NG. LAw, 3d ed., 54 (1814).
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"The itinera, or circuits appointed at the council.. of Northampton Were six; on each of which went three justices.. The
counties assigned to each of these circuits were as follows: in one,
the c:ounties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon, Bedford, Buckingham, Essex, Hertford; in another, Lincoln, Nottingham, Derby, Stafford, Warwick, Northampton; Leicester; in
another, Kent, Surrey, Southampton, Sussex, Berks, Oxford; in
another Hereford, Glocester, W ocester, Salop; in another, Wilts,
Dorset, Somerset, Devon, Cornwall; in another, York, Richmond, Lancaster,· Copland, Westmoreland, Northumberland, Cumberland."
The county of Middlesex, in which W estrninister ;Hall was located,
was not included in any of the circuits.24 When in 1179 the kingdom
was re-divided into four circuits, Middlesex was named as a county
in the third circuit.25
The -justices authorized to try civil cases on circuit were of two
· classes: (I) justices jn eyre and (2) justices of assize.
_
(I) Justices commissioned to hold a general eyre in a specified
county were empowered to hear "all pleas" within the county.26 This
power extended to cases from the county pending in the court of
Common Pleas.27 Bracton (middle 1200's) stated that when a summons to an eyre was made, pleas remained in the Berich until the iter
was begun.28 As Blackstone rationalized the practice, cases were continued from term to term in the court at W estrninister awaiting an
eyre so that "parties, witnesses, and jurors" might escape .the "intolerable burden" of travelling· from Westmoreland, or perhaps from
Cornwall, to try some "trifling" trespass at Westrninister Hall.29 It
should be noted, however, that eyres were not held regularly, and that
several years might elapse between one eyre and the next. While the
general eyre accomplished something in the direction of providing a
convenient place for the trial of civil actions, its chief purpose was
the exaction of fines and penalties. Having become highly unpopular
because of the burdens it placed on the entire county, it was discontinued in the first half of the B0O's. 30
24 Id. at 55.
25Ibid.
26Bolland, Introduction to the Eyre of Kent 1313-1314, 24 SELDEN Soc. xvii (1909).
27 Id. at xviii; I HoLDSWORTH, Hisi-. fum. LAw, 6th ed., 267 (1938).
28 BRAcroN, folio 110.
20 3 BLACKS'!'. CoMM. 352, Cooley, 4th ed., by Andrews (1899).
ao I HoLDswoRTH, lhs'l'. ENc. LAw, 6th ed., 272 (1938).
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(2) A commission of assize authorized the persons named in the
commission to try possessory assizes in specified counties. The possessory assizes were methods of trial established in the second half
of the 1100's for recovery of possession of land. A writ was issued
to the sheriff to summon twelve men of the neighborhood to answer
the questions as to seisin raised by the assize.31 An assize at Westminister or wherever the king might be usually meant that the jurors
and parties had to travel to the place of trial. Travel was difficult and
the distance might be great. An assize in the county in which the
land was situated was a great convenience for the jurors and parties,
if not for the justices who must hold the assize. In 1215 Magna Carta
provided: 32
"Inquests of novel disseisin, of mort d' ancestor, and darrein
presentment, shall not be held elsewhere than in their own
county-courts, and that in manner following, - We, or, if we
should be out of the realm, our chief justiciar, will send two justiciars through every county four times a year, who shall, along
with four knights of the county chosen by the county, hold the
said assizes. in the county court, on the day and in the place of
meeting of that court."
But the promises of the charter were not immediately fulfilled. The
king continued the old-practice of issuing commissions of assize at
irregular times and upon individual application.33 In 1272, however,
regular circuits were established, two justices being assigned to each
group of counties.34 In 1285 it was provided that assizes be held in
each county "at most" three times each year. 35

7. Nisi prius
The statute of 128 5 (Westminister II) authorized the justices of
assize (who now must be sworn judges of the courts at Westminister)
to determine "inquisitions of trespass" and "inquisitions also of other
pleas pleaded in either of the· benches." A case tried on circuit was
commenced at W estminister and there pleaded to issue. The venire
for a jury directed the sheriff to summon a jury to W estminister on
a certain day, unless before (nisj prius) the justices of assize should
31 Id.

at 329.
32McKEcmm!, MAGNA CAI\TA, 2d ed., c. 18 at 269 (1914).
33 I HoLDSWORTH, HxsT. ENG. LAw, 6th ed., 277 (1938).

MJbid.
85 Statute of Westminister II, c. 30 (13 Edw. I).
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come into the county. After trial at "nisi prius" the verdict was sent
to Westminister where judgment was rendered by the court in which
the action had been commenced. This practice, limited at first to the
less important cases, was gradually extended until almost all civil
actions commenced in the courts at W estminister were tried on circuit.86 It has been said that "the practice of joining issues in the
Benches at W estmiriister and trying them in the country at nisi prius
became. general in the second half of the fourteenth century."87

8.

Court of chancery

The chancery as a public board or office became a separate department of the king's general court in 1238.88 • The head of this
department was also the head of the king's council. Petitions for
relief in situations in which relief could not be had in the regularly
established courts, were referred to the chancellor for consideration
by the council or by the board. After the board became "settled" at
W estminister the chancellor and council might meet at the marble
table on which the writs were sealed, or in the privacy of a council
chamber.89 In the B00's many petitions referred to the council in
chancery were determined by justices of assize under commissions
of oyer and terminer.40 Due to insistence that decisions be made
by the council itself,41 commissions of oyer and terminer were supplanted by commissions of inquiry and writs of dedimus potestatum.42
For instance, a commission of inquiry issued in 139748 commanded
the justices assigned to take assizes of Lincoln county to "make diligent inquiries by the oath of proved and lawful men of the County
aforesaid, by whom the truth of the mattei: may better be known, as to
all and singular contained in the said petitions .... " The justices
were further commanded to return the writ with the result of the
inq~iry to the king in chancery. Writs of dedimus potestatum were

-

86 I HoLDSWORTH, HrsT. ENG. LAw, 6th ed., 279 (1938).
87Turner, Introduction to Year Books 3 & 4 Edw. 2 (1309-1311) 22 SELDEN Soc.
xxvi (1907). Also see Introduction to Year Books 4 Edw. 2 (1311), 42 SELDEN Soc.
lxi (1925) where it is said: "The circuit system, which has lasted with little alteration
till the present day, dates from the statute of 14 Edward III' [1340-1341]. For many years
the only issues of fact which were tried at Westminister were in Middlesex cases and a few
others of exceptional importance. • • ."
881 HoLDswoRTH, HrsT. ENG. LAw, 6th ed., 395 (1938).
89 BALDWIN, THE KrnG's CotrnCIL 261, n. 1 (1913).
40 PALGRAVE, AUTHORITY oP THE Kmc's CoUNCIL 27 (1834).
41 BALDWIN, THE Kmc's CotrnCIL 268 (1913).
42 Baildon, Select Cases in Chancery 1364-1471, 10 SELDEN Soc. xxviii (1896).
4 8 Id. at 33-34.
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used in much the same way. 44 Under this practice witnesses were not
required to make burdensome journeys to W estminister to testify
before the court. The scheme was quite similar to the nisi prius system. Under the one, the inquiry on circuit was by witnesses; under
the other, by jurors. Under both the result was returned to Westminister where judgment was made.
Prior to about 1450 the defendant was required to appear in person
to be examined orally by the chancellor, and to give answer under oath
to the plaintiff's petition.45 After 1450 the answer was in writing. 46
It has been suggested that this change was for the convenience of the
defendant who might be ill or live some distance from the court.47
Also, "the practice of taking evidence by written deposition came in
probably about the same time as written answers, and no doubt for
the same reasons."48
B. Place of Service of Civil Process

1.

Real actions

Of the king's central courts, only the Court of Common Pleas
had jurisdiction of the large group of actions known as real actions.
An action of this kind was commenced by filing a praecipe for an
original writ. The action, being local, was required to be "laid" in
the county in which the land was situated. The original ¼7Dt directed
the sheriff of the county to "summon" the tenant "by good summoners" to be before the king's justices at W estminister at a time
specified. Britton, written in the 1290's, states:
,
"When any one then is to be lawfully summoned, wherever
he be found in the county where the demand is made, he may be
reasonably summoned in his proper person by two freemen terretenants of the county. For no one is obliged to receive a summons
out of the precinct of the county, unless from the mouth of a
Justice himself. And if he is not found, then it is sufficient to
make the summons at his house, so that he may be informed
thereof when he returns. And if the tenant has several houses,
let it be made at that which is upon the land demanded, if he be
resident there, or has any family there who can inform him of
44 Id.

45 Id.
46

at xxviii.
at xxvii.

Ibid.

47 Id.
48 Id.

at xxvii.
at xxviii. Also see 2

DANIELL, CHANCERY PRACTICE

*489 (1846).
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the summons. And if no land is demanded, let it be made at that
house where he chieB.y resides; and if he has no house in the
county, then it is sufficient to make the summons in the fee where
he is distrainable, with a great number of neighbors for witnesses. ''.49
·
·
Whether this is a statement of the· law as it then was, or partly as it
was and partly as it should be, is not entirely clear. Coke, writing
in the first half of the 1600's, stated that "the summons alwayes is made
upon the land by two_ sumners, whether the tenant, or any for him,
be there or no."50 A note in Wms. Saunders adds: "and the demandant is not bound to give him notice of the summons."51 A statute
enacted in 1588-1589 provided:
-"That after every summons upon the land in any real action,
fourteen days at the least before the day of the return thereof,
proclamation of the summons shall be made on a Sunday ... at
or near the most usual door of the church or chapel of that town
or -parish where the land~ whereupon the summons was made~
doth lie."52
This statute recites that it was enacted "for the avoiding of secret
summons in real actions without convenient notice to the tenants of
the freehold."
'
If, after summons was made, the tenant did not appear, the land
involved could be taken "into the king's hands" by a cape magnum
(grand cape).53 If, upon the return of this writ, the default was not
excused, the.court could enter a judgment for the demandant.54 The
land was before the court and could be dealt with by judgment even
though the tenant was absent and might not have had actual notice
of the action in time to defend.
A judgment in a real action could be executed by the sheriff of
the county in which the action was "laid" because it was always
"laid" in the county in which th~ land was situated.
This simplified sketch of process in the real actions indicates why
there was never any attempt to make these actions transitory instead
49 Translation by Nichols 340. 50 SECOND lNsnTUTE 253. I
51 2 Wms. Saunders 43, n. 1, 85
52 31 Eliz. c. 3.

Eng. Rep. 602 (1668).

53 2 PoLLocK & MAln.AND, Hi:sT. ENG~ LAw, 2d ed., 592 (1911). BoOTH, REAL
(of a grand cape).
~

ACTIONS 20 (1704)
54 Id. at 19 (of

default before appearance).
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of local. All steps necessary to commence the action could be taken at
W estminister or in the county in which the land was situated; the
case could be tried by jurors -from that county; and the judgment
executed in that county. This scheme of conducting the entire proceedings as in one county was possible by omitting any requirement
that the court have jurisdiction over the person who was summoned
to defend the action. It is obvious that there was no possibility of trying
in England a real action involving land beyond the seas.

2.

Personal actions

In the personal actions there was no judgment by default prior
to 1725.'15 Unless the defendant was before the court it could not
render a judgment binding his person. The great object of process
in the personal actions was to force the defendant to appear.
In the 1200's the :first step was to summon the defendant by "good
summoners" as in the real actions. At the same time there might be
an attachment of some of his personal property to force him to appear.
If he did not appear, more and more of his property was seized until
he appeared or his property was exhausted.56
In the action of trespass, which had its origin in the middle of
the 1200's, the defendant could be arrested and brought forcibly
before the court. 57 A statute enacted in 1267 provided:
"That if bailiffs, which ought to make account to their lords,
do withdraw themselves and have no lands nor tenements whereby
they may be distrained, then they shall be attached by their bodies;
so that the sheriff in whose bailiwick they be found shall cause
them to come to make their account."58
This statute indicates that an absconding bailiff might be arrested
in any county in which he was found. In 1352 a statute provided
that writs of capias might be used in actions of debt and detinue "as
is used in a Writ of Accompt."59 By statute of 1504 the same process
as used in trespass or debt was provided for trespass on the case. 60
In 1531 the capias was extended to covenant. 61
•
55 See 2 PoLLOCK & MAITLAND, HrsT.
at note 69.
56 Id. at 593-595.
57 Id. at 594.
58 52 Hen. 3, c. 23.
59 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 17.
60 19 Hen. 7, c. 9.
61 23 Hen. 8, c. 14.

ENG.

LAw, 2d ed., 594 (1911), and

infra
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Another process for,compelling the defendant to appear was outlawry. First used in the action of trespass, this process was extended
by statute in 1285 to account, in 1352 to debt and detinue, and in
1504 to trespass on the case. 62 Resort to outlawry was permitted after
all other means had failed to force the defendant to appear. A writ
of exigi facias was directed to the sheriff commanding him to cause
, the defendant to be ~proclaimed." or "exacted" at five county courts.
This ceremony could take place in the county in which the action
was "laid.1' In 1515 it was provided by statute that if the defendant
resided in another county, proclamation must also be made in that
county. 63
It will be noted that capias and outlawry were not available in
actions of debt until 1352. Prior to this date the only way the plaintiff
could put pressure on the defendant to appear was by successive distraints of his property. If the plaintiff "laid" his action in the county
in which his claim arose, and it turned out that the defendant had no property in that county, the plaintiff was helpless. It is not surprising that a practice was developed under which the plaintiff could
"lay" his action "in any county wherein the debtor have sufficient out
of which he may be justiced."64
In trespass it was possible for the plaintiff to "lay" his action in
the county in which his claim arose and have the defendant arrested
in any county in which he was found. This was accomplished by the
testatum capias. The original capias was directe_d to the sheriff of the
county in which the action was "laid." Upon return "not found,"
, an alias capias could be issued to the sheriff of another county where
,the defendant was thought to be "lurking." 65 This practice was followed in the other personal actions after the capias was made available
for those actions. Margi,lret Hastings refers to sixteen cases at one term
of the Court of Common Pleas in the middle 1400's in which testatum capiases were issued. 66 'In the King's Bench a similar writ known
as a "latitat" was used. A bill of Middlesex (kind of capias) was first
issued to the sheriff of Middlesex. Upon return of this writ unserved
a latitat could be issued_ to sheriff of any other county..67
62 PLUCKNE'r, A CoNCISE Hxs'r. OF CoMMON LAW, 2d. ed., 342-343 (1936).
63 6 Hen. 8, c. 4.
·
64 Infra at note 109.
65 3 BuCKS'r, COMM, 283, Cooley, 4th ed., by Andrews (1899).
66 HASTINGS, CoUR'r OF COMMON PLEAS IN 15'rH CEN'r. ENG. 183 (1947) ..
67 3 BLACKS'r. CoMM. 285, Cooley, 4th ed., by Andrews (1899). A discourse

against
the jurisdiction of the King's Bench over Wales by process of latitat will be found in
HARGRAVE's TRACTS 379 (1787).
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If the defendant was not brought in by capias, testatum capias,
or latitat, the final process was outlawry. This process, though dilatory,
was usually effective because of its penalties. 68 Its pressure was effec~
rive whether the defendant was in hiding in England or had gone
beyond the seas. The courts were liberal in reversing an outlawry, but_
if the defendant came in to ask for a reversal he was held to answer the
plaintiff's action.
A statute enacted in 1725 prohibited arrest on civil process in
cases involving less than f. 10 and in all other cases unless an affidavit
of the "cause of action" should first be filed. 69 In cases involving less
than £10 and in those over £ 10 in which the required affidavit was
not filed, the plaintiff was authorized to serve the defendant "personally" with a copy of the process "within the jurisdiction of the
court." If the defendant should not appear, the plaintiff, after proof
of such "personal" service, could enter the defendant's appearance
and "proceed thereon" as if the defendant had appeared. This statute
introduced a principle of jurisdiction which was radically new. Under
the prior practice a court could not render a personal judgment unless
the defendant voluntarily appeared in person or by attorney, or was
brought before the court by physical force. The judgment was against
the person, and the person must be before the court. Under the
statute of 1725 a judgment could be rendered against a person who·
was not before the court. The new principle is that a court may render a personal judgment against a person who is given a notice "within
the jurisdiction of the court." The defendant need not be before the
court; it is enough that he was, at the time of service, within the
territory of the court. As to the place of service "within the jurisdiction
of the court'' Tidd stated: 70
"In the King's Bench, a bill of Middlesex must not be served
in London,- or elsewhere out of the county of Middlesex, nor
whilst the defendant is attending his cause at the sittings: And a
latitat cannot regularly be served in any county other than that
to the sheriff of which it is directed. So, in the Common Pleas,
a capias directed into one county, cannot be regularly served in another, although it happen that the same officer is :6lacer for both
counties: And a capias directed into Kent, cannot be well served
in the Cinque ports."
68 See description of outla'Yl'Y in 1st REP. CoMRs. TO lNQUIRB INTO PRAc. & Pnoc.
oF THI! SuPBRIOR CounTs oF CoMMON LAw 90-91 (1829).
69 12 Geo. I, c. 29.
70

I Tmn's

PRAcnCB

"'190 (1828).
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A sheriff could not act outside his county, and it was still. necessary
to direct the process to the sheriff of the county in which the defendant
could be served.
A judgment in a personal action was supposed to be executed in
the county in which the action was "laid." In Chandeler v. Anon.71
( 1317) the plaintiff "laid" his. action in London "because the agreement was made in London." The sheriffs of London returned that
the defendant "had ·naught mtheir jurisdiction." The plaintiff ''bore
witness" that the defendant had assets in Surrey, and '.'sued his writ
in Surrey." The defendant came into court and waged his law, but
later defaulted. A writ was issued to distrain him to hear judgment,
but the sheriff returned that the defendant had naught in his jurisdiction by which he could be distrained. Thereupon:
''BEREFORD, C. J. awarded that they should sue no further,
nor in any other county, but that [plaintiff] should recover his
debt and his damages without assessment etc., and that he should
sue a writ of execution to the Sheriffs of London because the
original had first been brought there. And then if he has·naught
there, you will have a writ to the Sheriff of Surrey, where he
came to answer by the testatum est etc."
Tidd, writing- in the early 1800's, stated that a party suing out
execution for a debt or damages might, at his election, have "a fieri
facias against the goods, a capias ad satisfaciendum against the person,
and an elegit against the goods and moiety of the lands, of the party
chargeable";72 also that he might have "several writs of the same sort,
running at the same tjme, in order to take the defendant, or his goods,
&c. in different counties. 73 By means of a testatum the plaintiff could
execute_ his judgment in any county.74

3.

Suits in chancery

A decree in chancery was against the person of the defendant and,
prior to ·1732, could not be made against a person not before the
court. Process in chancery, as in the personal actions at law, was a
series of steps to bring the defendant forcibly or otherwise before the
court.75 A statute enacted in 1732 provided that when a defendant
71 Year

Books, 11 Edw. 2, (1317-1318) 61 SELDEN Soc. 243-244 (1942).
2 TIDn's PRACTICE *1032 (1828).
7..3 Id. at *1033.
74 See "Testatum," Viner's Ahr. (1744).
75See 9 HoLDSWORTH, HisT. ENG, LAW, 3rd ed., 348-353 (1923).
12
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could not be served with a subpoena or other process, and it appeared
that he had "gone out of the realm or otherwise absconded" to avoid
service, the court could make an order :fixing a time for appearance.76
The statute further provided:
"A copy of such order shall within fourteen days after such
order made be inserted in the London Gazette, and published on
some Lord's day, immediately after divine service, in the parish
church of the parish where such defendant or defendants respectively made his, her or their usual abode within thirty days next
before such his, her or their absenting; and also a copy of such
order shall within the time aforesaid be posted up as after mentioned ( that is to say) a copy of every such order made in his
Majesty's high court of chancery, court of exchequer, or the court
of the dutchy chamber of Lancaster at W estminister, shall be
posted up in some publick place at the Ro_yal Exchange in London;
and a copy of every such order made in the courts of equity of the
counties palatine of Chester, Lancaster and Durham, or of the
great sessions in Wales, shall be posted up at some public~ place
in some market town within the jurisdiction of the court by which
such order was made, and nearest to the place where such defendant or defendants respectively made his, her or their usual abode
as aforesaid, such place of abode being also within the jurisdiction
of the said court."
'

If, after such publication, the defendant did not appear, the court
could order that the plaintiff's bill be taken as confessed. It was provided, however, that the statute should not extend to any person
"beyond the seas" unless it should appear that such person had been
in "that part of Great Britain called England, within two years next
before the Subpoena in such suit issued against such person."
The decree pro confesso authorized by this statute was a personal
judgment which could be enforced by sequestration of real and personal property, or by causing possession of the estate or effects demanded by the bill to be delivered to the plaintiff. The basis of the
jurisdiction was the presence of the defendant's usual place of abode
within the territory of the court and the presence of the defendant in
England within two years prior to the commencement of the suit.
Except as limited by the above statute, the process of the Court
of Chancery could be executed in any county.
76

5 Geo. 2, c. 25.
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Place From Which Jurors' Were Summoned

The author of-Gl?I1vil, writing about ll87, described in detail
.a newly-devised procedure for trying cases involving •title to land.77

From the beginning of the Norman period the usual method of trying
-such cases in the king's court had been by physical contest-trial by
. · battle. Legislation of about '1179 provided that the tenant (defendant
:in such an action) might have trial by assize instead of trial by battle
if he so elected. The tenant having elected trial by assize,, a writ was
issued to the sheriff commanding him to summon four lmights of
the vicinage (neighborhood) of the vill in which the land was situated
to elect twelve lmights of that vicinage "who better lmow the truth"
to return on their oaths which of the parties has the "greater right"
in the land. 78 No provision was made for proof, the author of Glanvil
:Saying:10
"When the Assize proceeds to make the Reco~ition, the tight -will be well lmown either to all the Jurors, or some may lmow it,
and some not, or all may be alike ignorant concerning it. If none
of them are acquainted witli the truth of the matter, and this be
testified upon their oaths to the Court, recourse must be had to
- -others, until such can be found who do lmow the- truth of it.
. . . With respect to the lmowledge requisite on the part of
those sworn, they should be acquainted with the merits of the
cause, either from what they have personally seen and heard, or
from the declarations of their Fathers, and from other sources
' equally entitled to credit, as if falling within their own immediate
Imowledge."_
That the recognitors were required to -answer from their own lmowledge clearly indicates why they were to be summoned from the vicinage of the vill in which the land was situated.
·
·
What was true of the grand assize was true also of the possessory
assizes and the ordinary jury. The jurors or some of them had to be
summoned from the vicinity of the place in which the claim or defense
arose so that lmowledge of the facts would be available. Fortescue,
writing in the years 1468-1471, stated that of the twelve jurors "at
least four shall be of the hundred in which the vill is situated wherein
the fact in issue is alleged ~o have occurred."80 Six hundredors were
77 Translation by
78Jd. at 48.
10 Id. at 53-54.

Beames (reprinted in 1900) 44-46.

so DB LAtrnmus LEcuM ANcLm, Chrimes ed., c. 25, p. 59 (1942).
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required by statute in 1543-1544.81 In 1584-1585 the :pumber for
personal actions was reduced to two. 82 In 1705 the requirement of
hundredors was abolished for civil cases.83 After 1705 the jury was
summoned "de corpore comitatus, from the body of the county at large,
and not de vicineto, or from the particular neighborhood." 84
At the time of Fortescue the fundamental change of the jury from
persons who answered questions of fact from their own knowledge
to persons who decided issues of fact from the testimony of witnesses,
was far advanced85 but not complete. In commencing an action the
plaintiff was required to "lay" his action in the county in which his
claim arose. 86 His declaration must state the particular place (parish,
vill, or hamlet) at which each traversable fact occurred. 87 If the defendant denied these facts, the jurors were summoned from the place
or places named by the plaintiff. If the defendant alleged new facts
by the way of confession and avoidance he must state the particular
place at which each new fact occurred. Issues formed by denying
these facts were tried by jurors from the places named.88 If the defendant denied in part and justified in part, some of the jurors were
summoned from the place or places named by the plaintiff, and some
from the place or places named by the defendant. 89 This was true
even when the places were in different counties.90 In cases in which
the plaintiff's claim was founded on facts arising in different counties,
he could "lay" his action in any such county.91 Each issue formed by
denying the facts was tried by a jury from the appropriate county.
81 35 Hen. 8, c. 6.
82 27 Eliz., c. 6.
83 4 Anne, c. 16.
84 3 BLAcKST. CoMM.
85 ''How jurors ought

360, Cooley, 4th ed. by Andrews (1899).
to be informed by evidence and witnesses" is the title of a
chapter of DB LAUDmus LEGUM ANGLIB, Chrimes ed. (1942). See comment by PLuCKNBT, A CONCISE HisT. oF COMMON LAw, 2d ed., 120 (1936).
86 HAsnNGs, CotmT oF CoMMON PLBAs IN 15TH CENT. ENG., 159-160 (1947).
87 STEPHEN, PLEADING, Tyler, ed., 269-270 (1924).
_
88 Ford v. Brooke, Cro. Eliz. 261, 78 Eng. Rep 516 (1591): action :in k:ing's bench
was laid :in Essex for calling the plaintiff a perjured person. Defendant pleaded that
plaintiff was perjured :in an answer filed :in chancery at WestministCF· Venire to sheriffs
of Middlesex, "for the justification ariseth there, and the words were confessed."
89 Lapworth v. Wast, Cro. J ac. 86, 79 Eng. Rep. 74 (I 605): "To trespass on land
:in A. if the defendant plead not guilty to part, and to resdue justify for tithes, as Rector
of B. with:in which A. lies, the venire shall be awarded to both A. and B."
90 Nowel v. Dier, Cro. Jae. 128, 79 Eng. Rep. 111 (1606): action :in Berks for
slander. Defendant denied speak:ing part, and justified other part, alleging that plaintiff
had committed a felony :in Somerset. One venire was awarded to Berks to try both issues.
Held, mistrial as to one issue. For :instances of venires issued :in one action to different
counties, see 3 RBBVBs, HIST. ENG. LAw, 3d ed., 111 (1814).
91 Bulwer's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 411 (1584).
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A statute enacted in 1664-1665 provided "that after verdicJ: . : .
judgment shall not be stayed or reversed ... for that there is no right
venue, so as the cause were tried by a jury of the proper county or
place where the action is laid." 92 -The significance of this statute was
its recognition that trial by a jury of the vicinage was at this time
merely a matter of form. Trial by jurors who might have no knowledge of the facts involved, except as presented to them by witnesses,
was not objectionable so long as they came from the "county and
place" where the action was "laid." In Cra~ v. Boite (King's Bench,
1669)93 the plaintiff declared that the defendant "at London &c"
falsely accused the plaintiff of having stolen certain plate from Wad. ham College. The defendant by way of justification alleged that the
plaintiff "at Oxford, in the county of Oxford" stole certain plate from
Wadham College, wherefore the defendant "spoke the said words at
London aforesaid, as he well might." The plaintiff's reply was a general traverse. The issue thus formed was tried at nisi prius in London.
After verdict for the plaintiff, defendant moved in arrest of judgment
on the ground that, as the speakjng of the words had been confessed
by the defendant, the issue should have been tried in Oxford. The
court refused to arrest judgment, stating that the statute of 1664-1665
plainly provided that judgment should not be arrested after trial ''by
a jury of the proper county where the action was laid." It is obvious
that the jury which tried the issue in London had no personal knowledge of the only matter in issue-the alleged stealing of the plate in the
county of Oxford.
The decision in Cra~ v. Boite was "at first received with considerable disapprobation." 04 It was argued that the statute was intended
to aid a wrong venue in the county in which the issue arose, and not
a wrong county. In Jennings v. Hunkin95 (King's Bench, 1675) Hale,
C. J., stated:
"Though the words of the statute are so, yet the intent and
meaning of the statute is, that it may be tried in the county where
the matter in issue to be tried arises; for it is not reasonable to
imagine that the Parliament intended to alter the whole course
of trials, and to have things tried in foreign counties where the
jury are meer strangers to the parties, to the evidence, and to the
point in issue; it being the great foundation of trials by juries or
16 & 17 Chas. 2, c. 8.
r Wms. Saunders 246, 85 Eng. Rep. 289.
94 1 Wms. Saunders 248, n. 3, 85 Eng. Rep. 291.
95 2 Lev. 121, 83 Eng. Rep. 478.
92
93

,
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per pais, that they might not be strangers. But the intent of the
statute was only to cure trials by improper venues taken in the
same county where the matter is to be tried."
Although the other justices agreed that this was the "reasonable intent of the statute," the decision in Grafe 11. Boite was not overruled.
The Chief Justice did point out, however, that the defendant's plea
in this case (an action for calling the plaintiff a "perjured knave'')
contained two matters: (1) making the oath in Cornwall and (2) knowing that the ·fact sworn to was not true. "Knowing or not knowing
is matter transitory and triable in any county, although the making
oath before a Judge in Cornwal be local." He concluded by saying
that when an action is triable in two counties, "a trial in either of
them is good." Defendant's attorney argued "that local matter ought
to draw the transitory to it, and not the transitory matter, of which no
place is alledged, the local." He agreed, however, that if issue had been
taken on "the knowing," the trial would have been good.
In Lander 11. Elliot96 (King's Bench, 1688) it was argued that the
decision in Grafe 11. Boite should not be followed when the defendant's
plea relates to land in another county-"a local justification will alter
the case." It was pointed out that "locality" was not necessary to the
defense in Grafe 11. Boite. The court, apparently agreeing with this
view, declared a mistrial. In doing so it went against its holding in
Adderly 11. Wise91 (King's Bench, 1676). According to the report in
Hunt's Gase98 (Common Pleas, 1694) the question raised by Lander
11. Elliot was settled "by the opinion of four judges against three" in the
court of Exchequer Chamber in 1692. The court held that the statute
applied even when the defendant's defense related to land in another
county. The report adds that this decision was given "rather by the
greater number, than by any weight of argument," and that some of
the most "considerable" of the judges were of a contrary opinion. 00
After it was settled that an action might be tried by a jury from
the county in which the plaintiff ,ilaid" his action, regardless of the
locality of the defendant's defense, it became necessary to settle the
extent to which a plaintiff might exercise a choice in "laying" his
action.
96 Comb.

75, 90 Eng. Rep. 352.
2 Lev. 164, 83 Eng. Rep. 500.
os 3 Lev. 394, 83 Eng. Rep. 747.
99 Also see Leving v. Calverly, 1 Ld. Raym. 330, 91 Eng. Rep. 1116 (1698); The
Bailiffs v. Slater, Willes 431, 125 Eng. Rep. 1253 (1743).
97
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Choice of Place of Trial
1.

Real actions

The original reason for "laying" a real action in the county in
which the land was ,situated was the necessity of summoning recognitors or jurors who knew the facts. The practice of summoning the
tenant "on the land" made it necessary to direct the original writ to
the sheriff of the same county. Any judgment must be executed in
that county. Under this practice all writs-original, to summon jurors,
and to execute judgment-were directed to the same sheriff. ·The action was thought of as an action "of" the county in which it was "laid."
After proof by jurors was superseded by proof by witnesses there was
rio impelling reason for "laying" an .action in the county in which the
land was situated. The king's courts were national courts and could
have directed original writs and writs of execution to any county. But,
on the other hand, there was no impelling reason for making a change.
The old scheme was practical and reasonably convenien_t. That the person to be summoned might be absent from the county caused no
trouble. Witnesses were likely to be persons residing in the county.
.Furthermore, it was thought there was some advantage in having
jurors who might know the witnesses, and who might be taken to view
the land. There being some advantages in the old scheme, and no hardsliips calling for change, it is not surprising that the real actions remained local to the end. Although the demandant in such an action
had no choice of county, he did have, it seems, a choice of whether
a grand assize should be held before the Court of Common Pleas at
W estminister or on circuit in the county in which the land was situated.100
2. Ejectment and replevin

In its earliest form ejectment was a personal action for damages
for ejecting plaintiff from his farm. In 1499 it was held that in an
action of this form the plaintiff might also recover possession of his
land.101 Since the cause of action always arose in the county in which
the land was situated, the action was always "laid" in that_ county.
Notice of the action, which went to the person in possession,· could be
served in the same county. Execution of any judgment must be in
the same county. The action was localized in the sense that all steps
in the action co:u.ld be ~ken at W estminister or in the county in which
the land was situated. The action of replevin was also localized. It
lOOLuke v. Harris,

1013 HOLDSWORTH,

2 Wm. Blackst. 1261, 96 Eng. Rep. 742 (1778).
HisT. ENG. LAW, 3rd ed., 216 (1923).
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was always ''laid" or commenced in the county in which the wrongful
distress occurred, this being the county in which the cause of action
arose and in which presumably the property would be found. If the
property was not found, having been concealed or taken out of the
county, other property of the defendant could be taken by capias in
withemam. 102 That these actions were local meant, of course, that the
plaintiff had no choice of place of trial. It does not appear, however,
that this lack of choice caused any great hardship or inconvenience.
So settled was the practice in ejectrnent that able judges assumed that
it was necessary to "lay" the action in the county in which the land
was situated so the plaintiff could have execution of any judgment he
might recover. Lord Mansfield stated that a judgment in ejectrnent
"could not have effect, if the action was not laid in the proper county."103
This seems to mean that "laying" an action of ejectrnent in the proper
county was a matter of jurisdiction. While it was true a sheriff of
one county could not deliver possession of land in another, there was
no reason a judgment rendered in an action "laid" in one county could
not be executed by the sheriff of another, if the court should see fit to
issue a writ of execution to th~ sheriff of that county. As to land outside England the situation was different. In that case there would be
no sheriff to which a writ of execution could be issued.
3.

Covenant and debt

Unlike ejectrnent or replevin, a cause of action for debt or breach
of covenant might arise partly in one county and partly in another.
When this was the situation the plaintiff could "lay" his action in either
county. This was definitely established in Bulwer's Case104 (Common
Pleas, 1584) and re-affirmed in Mayor, etc. v. Cole105 (King's Bench,
1798). In the latter case the plaintiff alleged that a covenant-made in
London leasing land in Middlesex had been breached by refusing to
allow certain use of the land. After trial in London, the defendants
moved in arrest of judgment "on the ground that the action was local
and should have been tried in the county of Middlesex where the land
was situate...." In denying the motion, the court distinguished the·
case from one to recover the possession of the land. That type of case
"is necessarily local, because the possession of land situate in one
county, cannot be delivered by the sheriff of-another." .
102 GILBERT, LAw oF D1STRBss AND REPLEVINS 101 (1823).
10a Infra, note 121.
104 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 411.
105 7 Term Rep. 583, 584, 587, 101 Eng. Rep. 1144.
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If the plaintiff's claim arose partly iii a foreign country and partly
in an English county, the action could be "laid" in the English county
under the rule followed in Bulwer's Case. If, however, it arose entirely in the foreign country there was no English county in which the
action could be "laid." In Dowdale's Case106 (Common Pleas, 1605) it
was "agreed, that where as well the contract as the performance of
it is wholly mad~, or to be done beyond the sea, and it so appears,
there it is not triable in our law." In Ward's Case107 (King's Bench,
1625) the only question considered was whether it appeared that the
plaintiff's claim arose beyond the sea. Plaintiff declared on a bill
bearing date in the parish of Saint Mary of the Bow in London. When
the bill was produced (sur oyer) it bore date af Hamburgh. It was
objected that "Hamburgh shall be understood to be a town which
cannot be in London. And for this the declaration is faulty for not
laying Hamburgh in London." In reply it was argued that since the
bill merely says Hamburgh, and does not show on its face it was made
in a foreign country, it will be considered that Hamburgh is in London.
Dodderige, J., agreed, saying:
"We, the judges, must maintain the jurisdiction of our Court,
if the case is not plainly and evidently outside its jurisdiction.
And therefore we must understand Hamburgh to be in London
in order to maintain the action because otherwise it would. be
outside our jurisdiction. And if in truth we know the date to be
at Hamburgh across the sea, we as Judges do not take notice that
it is across the sea."
·
Jones, J., agreed with Dodderige. Crew, C. J., doubted, because the
obligation was in Hamburgh money and so the place must be understood to be Hamburgh beyond the sea. Jn Roberts v. Harnage108
(King's Bench, 1704) the plaintiff declared on a bond dated at London in the parish of Saint Mary of the Bow in the ward of Cheape.
On oyer it appeared that the bond was dated at Port St. Davids in the
East Indies. The court held this to be a variance, but pointed out
that plaintiff might have declared "that the plaintiff apud Port St.
Davids in the East Indies, viz. apud London in paroch, &c."
The pleading device recognized in Roberts v. Harnage was the
final step in the development of one of the significant fictions of the
c~mmon law. Where the fiction was applicable, a claim which arose
106 6 Co. Rep. 47, 77 Eng. Rep. 323.
107 Latch 4, 82 Eng. Rep. 245.
10s 2 Salk. 659, 91 Eng. Rep. 561.
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outside England could be sued on in England by alleging that it arose
at a certain place (the true place abroad) "towit" or "viz" in a certain
English county-the county in which the action was "laid." And the
plaintiff, by using the device, could "lay" his action in any English
county. Furthermore, it should be noted that this freedom of choice
was not limited to claims arising abroad. An action on any claim of
the type to which the fiction applied could be "laid" in any county the
plaintiff might choose.
Prior to the development of this fiction the plaintiff in a debt action
was permitted to "lay" his action either in the county in which the
agreement was made or in a county in which the defendant "might
be best brought in to answer." According to the record of the Eyre
of Kent (1313-1314),

"Stonore defended and said: Sir, you have seen plainly in what
circumstances John claims this debt, counting on an agreement
made in one county, while the writ is addressed to the Sheriff of
another county; and, by reason of this, we ask judgment of the writ.
'Westcote. Sir, a writ may be brought in any county wherein
the debtor have sufficient out of which he may be justiced, or in
the county where the agreement was made.
"Stonore. . .. But the people of this county cannot make recognition touching the acts of people in another county; and so, as
before, we ask judgment.
"STAUNTON, J. By the old law the writ in this case might
have abated; but the contrary has been the practice for a long time
past; and so plead over."109
It should be noted at this point that a defendant in a debt action
could "wage his law." This method of trial could take place in one
county as well as another. The only problem was one of convenience.
If the plaintiff should "lay" his action in a county other than that in
which the defendant and his "oath helpers" resided, they would be
put to the inconvenience and expense of travelling to the county in
which the action was "laid."
Prior to 1352 the only process for compelling a defendant to appear in an action of debt was successive distraints of his personal property. As this property might be in any county, and might follow the
defendant from county to county, the plaintiff was allowed to "lay"
his action "wherein the defendant have sufficient out of which he may
100 Randolph v. Abbott of Hailes, Eyre of Kent (1313-1314) II, 27
· 32 (1912). Also see Anon. v. Anon., id. at 33.
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be justiced." It has been said that the action was "transitory" in that
it "related to goods and chattels, and was to follow the defendant wherever he could be found."110 A "local" action '.'related to lands and
the process was to be upon the lands."111
After the· statute oL 1352 had provided for the use of- the capi~
in debt actions, and for outlawry in case the capias could not be served,
a statute passed in 1382 provided: "If from henceforth in Ple_as [upon
Writs of Debt and Accompt] it shall be declared, That the contract
thereof was made in another County than is contained in the Original
Writ, that then incontinently the same Writ shall utterly abate."112
The purpose of this statute was to restore the old practice of requiring
the· plaintiff to "lay" his action in the county in which his cause of
action arose. This was fairer to defendants, and caused the plaintiff
no great hardship now that he could have a capias to any county. But
to take care of the case which arose outside any English county it was
necessary to develop the fiction referred to above.
In Bulwer's Case : 13 (Common Pleas, 1584) Lord Coke stated:
"At common law the person of the defendant is chargeable in
the action of debt, and not the land. And before the statute of
6 R. 2, c.2. [ 1382] a writ of debt and account against a receiver,
and such actions might be brought in such county where the party
might be best brought in to answer, and the plaintiff might have
declared on a contract or receipt, &c. in any other county, quad
debitum et contractus, &c. sunt nullius loci."
'

.

Prior to 1352 an action of debt was associated with the defendant's
movable,or transitory property. This old association seems to have led
to the declaration that "debt and contract are of no place."
_The privilege of "laying" an action of covenant or· debt in any
county was never extended to actions of debt for arrears of a rent
charge when. based on privity of estate,114 or upon covenants running
with land when based on privity of estate.115 When between the immediate parties, the actions were transitory; but when based on privity of
estate, .the actions were local. Contracts followed the person; privity
was associated with the land. Blackstone, writing in the l760's, said:
110 BooTE,
111 Ibid.
112 6 Rich.

AN

HisTORICAL TREATISE oF AN ACTION OR

SUIT
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LAw 153 (1823).

2, c. 2. A statute of 1402 provided that attorneys should be sworn "especially that they make no suit in a foreign country." 4 Hen. 4, c. 18.
113 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 411.
114 Wicker, "The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory
Actions," 4 TENN. L. REv. 55 at 62 (1925).
115 Ibid.
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"In local actions, where possession of land is to be recovered,
or damages for an actual trespass, or for waste, &c., affecting land,
the plaintiff must lay his declaration or declare his injury to have
happened in the very county and place that it really did happen;
but [i] n transitory actions, for injuries that might have happened
any where, as debt, detinue, slander, and the like, the plaintiff
may declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial must
be had in that county in which: the declaration is laid."116
According to Stephen, writing in the 1820's, a transitory matter "consisted of such facts as might be supposed to have happened any
where."117
Blackstone's view that an action is transitory when it is for an injury which "might have happened" at some place other than where
it "really did happen," has been severely criticized. "No one," says
Professor Scott, "has ever suggested any reason why it should make any
difference whether events might or might not have occurred at some
other place than where they did occur."118 Coke's distinction was between matters of place and matters of no place. Land was always of
place. "Things personal" were "transitory and perishable."119

4. Tre:Spass and case
When a tort was committed partly in one county and partly in another the plaintiff could "lay" his action in either county. In Bulwer's
Case,120 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant maliciously caused the
plaintiff to be outlawed in London on process issued at Westminister,
and caused him to be imprisoned in Norfolk. He "laid" his action in
Norfolk. The court approved this choice of place, pointing out that
the "visible wrong" was in Norfolk, "and therefore it is great reason
that the plaintiff may have his action there."
_In Mostyn v. Fahrigas1 21 (King's Bench, 1774) the plaintiff declared that the defendant made an assault on him "at Minorca (to wit)
at London aforesaid; in the parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the ward of
Cheap." Lord Mansfield asked: "can it be doubted, that actions may
be maintained here, not only upon contracts, which follow the persons, but for injuries done by subject to subject; especially for injuries
116 3 BLACKST. CoMM. 294, Cooley, 4th ed. by Andrews (1899).
117 STEPHEN, PLEADING, Tyler ed., 274 (1924).
- 11s FUNDAMENTALS oP PnoCBDURE IN ACTIONS AT

LA.w 4 (1922).
119 3 BLACKST. COMM, 145, Cooley, 4th ed. by Andrews (1899).

120 7 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 411 (1584).
1211 Cowp. 161 at 166, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021.
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where_ the whole that is pr~yed is a reparation in damages, or satisfaction to be made by process against the person or his effects, within
the jurisdiction of the court?" His answer was: "\Ve know it is within
every day's experience." Earlier in his opinion he had said:
"There is a formal and a substantial distinction as to the locality
of trials. I state them as different things: the substantial distinction is, where the proceeding is in rem, and where the effect of
the judgment cannot be had, if it is laid in a wrong place. Th~t
is the case of all ejectments, where possession is to be delivered
by the sheriff of the county; and as trials in England are in particular counties, the officers are county officers; therefore the judgment could not have effect, if the action was not laid in the proper
county....
"But there is likewise a formal distinction, whfch arises from
the mode of trial; for trials in England being by jury, and the
kingdom being divided into counties, and each county considered
as a separate district or principality, it is absolutely necessary that
there should be some county where the action is brought in particular, that there may be a process to the sheriff of that county,
to bring a jury from thence to try it."
· The distinction thus made is the modern distinction between jurisdiction and venue. When a court has jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant it may render a judgment binding his person. Likewise,
a court having jurisdiction over land may render a judgment affecting
the title or changing the possession of the land. But for a court to have
jurisdiction over land, the land must be situated within the territory
of the sovereign, and within the territory of the court if the court's
territory is less than that of the sovereign.
In Doulson v. Matthews1 22 (King's Bench, 1792) it was held that
trespass would not lie in England for entering a house in Canada.
Buller, J., said: "It is now too late for us to inquire whether it were
wise or politic to make a distinction between transitory and local actions: it is sufficient for the Courts that the law has settled the distinction, and that an action of quare clausum fregit is local." The court
did not suggest that it lacked jurisdiction to render the judgment, and
it seems clear that no valid argument to this effect could have been
made. The judgment sought would not be against the land, but against
a person who was before the court. The obvious hardship caused by
this decision has been a topic of frequent comment. The hardship was
122

4 Durnford & East 503, 504, 100 Eng. Rep. 1143.
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not merely that of going to some distant place outside the country to
bring an action against a person who might be residing next door to
the plaintiff; the real hardship was the probability that the plaintiff
could not sue at all.

5.

Other personal actions

Except for actions against innkeepers based on local customs,1 28
and except for the three types of personal actions mentioned above,124
all personal actions for damages were :finally recognized as transitory,
-and, therefore, could be "laid" in any county the plaintiff might choose.
Within England the plaintiff's· choice of place was remarkably free.

6.

Suits in chancery

Since juries were not used in suits in chancery, these suits were
not "laid" in particular counties. The court, sitting at one place, administered justice in the country at large. Decrees were against the
. person of the defendant. When a decree required delivery of possession
of land, a writ could be issued to the sheriff of the county in which the
land was situated directing him to assist the plaintiff in taking possession. In a case involving foreign land the court might have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and power to render a _personal
judgment against him, yet not have power to execute 'completely a
decree by forcible delivery of possession. The choice of place involved
in this situation was between England where the defendant was,_ and
the sovereignty where the land was. In Penn 11. Baltimore125 (Chancery, 1750) Lord Chancellor Hardwicke stated:
"As to the court's not inforcing the execution of their judgment;
if they could not at all, I agree, it would be vain to make a decree;
and that that the court cannot inforce their own decree in rem,
in the present case: but that is not an objection against making a
decree in the cause; for the strict primary decree in this court as
a court of equity is in personam. . . . In Lord King's time in the
case of Richardson 11. Hamilton, Attorney-General of Pennsylvania,
which was a suit of land and a house in the town of Philadelphia,
the cot;trt made a decree, though it could not be inforced in rem.
In the case of Lord Anglesey of land lying in Ireland, I decreed
128 Wicker, ''The Development of the Distinction Between Local and Transitory
Actions," 4 TENN. L. Rsv. 55 at 62 (1925).
.
124Ibid.
125 1 Vesey Sr. 444, 454, 27 Eng. Rep. 1132.
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for distinguishing and settling parts of the estate, though impossible to inforce that decree iii rem, but the party being in England,
I could inforce it by process of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is the proper juri~diction of the court."
In this case the court held that it might properly decree the specific
performance of an agreement made in England concerning the boundaries of two provinces in America, even though it was without jurisdiction to enforce its decree in rem-.

E. Change of Place of Trial
After development of the distinction between local and transitory
actions, the plaintiff could "lay" a transitory action in any county. The
defendant, however, could have the venue changed by making a positive affidavit that the plaintiff's cause of action (if any) arose in a
specified county, and not in the county in which the action was
"laid."126 When it appeared that the action arose wholly in the county
specified _by the defendant, change to that county was, ordinarily, a
matter of course. The rule was applied as a rule of thumb. If any
part of the action arose in a county other than that specified by the
defendant, the change was not made.127
In some ~ases, however, it was recognized that change should be
granted or denied on grounds of convenience. The chief consideration
was the inconvenience and expense of bringing witnesses from a distant county. In Holmes -v. Wainwright1 28 (King's Bench, 1803) Lord
Ellenborough, C: J., stated that it was a,matter of balancing the convenience. Wh~re balanced "in any degree'' the court should not interfere with the plaintiff's general right to try his case where any part of
his cause arose. But where "all the convenience and justice of the case
preponderates in favour of the application," it should be granted. The
Chief Justice pointed out that the courts of King's Bench and Common
Pleas were "formerly very strict in treating applications of this sort" but
"of late years" had listened to them "with more indulgence, where they
have seen that the real inconvenience and justice of the case required
it." In the case before the court it appeared that all of the defendant's
witnesses lived at a great distance from the county in which the action
was "laid," and that the defendant was willing to admit the only fact
alleged to have occurred in that county.
659 (1828).
at 652. Also see note to Heathcoat's Case, 2 Salk. 670, 91 Eng. Rep. 570

126 TroD's PRACTICE,
121 Id.

(1705).
128 3

East 329, 330, 102 Eng. Rep. 624.
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II
FEDERAL

1789-1948

A. Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
After dividing the United States into thirteen districts, the £rst
federal judiciary act (1789)1 29 provided that a district court should be
held in each district by a judge appointed for that district. In three of
the districts the court was to sit at one specified place; in the other ten,
two places for holding the court were specified.130 A special court
could be held "at such o_ther place in the district" as the "nature of the
business" and the "discretion" of the judge should "direct." The thirteen districts, except Maine and Kentucky, were divided into three circuits. Each circuit court was to be· held at specified places in the districts of the circuit. Provision was made for a marshal who should have
power "to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed
to him." Further, it was provided:
"No person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another,
in any civil action before a circuit or district court. And no civil
suit shall be brought before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any
other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which
he shall be found at the time of serving the writ."
The effect of these provisions was to make the federal districts independent civil-action territories-as independent as separate sovereignties. An action must be commenced in a particular district and there
prosecuted to judgment. Execution of the judgment must be in the
district. Parties, jurors, and witnesses must be summoned in the district.
B.

Place of Service of Civil Process

The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not prescribe the methods of serving
process within a district. This problem was dealt with by another act
passed the same year,1 31 which provided that the "forms of writs and
executions" and the "modes of process" in "suits at common law" should
be the same in each state respectively as then "used or allowed in the
129 1 Stat. L. 73-93.
180 For changes made

in the bill as first drafted, see Warren, ''New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 at 72, n. 53 (1923).
Warren states that these changes were in recognition of "the sentiment relative to the
dragging of persons from their homes long distances to the District Courts." Id. at 72.
131 I Stat. L. 93.
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supreme courts of the same," except as otherwise provided by federal
statute. The "forms and modes of proceedings" in equity and admiralty were to be <'according to the course of the civil law." This act
was re-enacted in 1790,1 32 and again in 1791.133-In 1792 the act was
amended and made permanent.134 The provisions for actions at law
remained the same, but with a further provision that the state practice might be altered by rule of court. Forms of writs, executions, and
other process in eguity and admiralty y.rere to be "according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity and to courts
of admiralty r~ectively."
The scheme of regulation of process under which process in ac- _
tions at law was to conform to state practice, and that in equity and
admiralty was to be governed by the traditional practice in those courts,
was continued by the Process Act of 1828,1 35 and by the Conformity
Act of 1872.136 The scheme continued in force until the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure went into effect in 1938.
Although the federal courts had power under t}ie act of 1792 to
regulate their practice by their own rules, this power was sparingly
used in actions at law.137 The tendency was to follow state practice.138 The practice for equity and admiralty cases was, on -the other
hand, largely regulated by rules of court. An equity rule governing
service of process adopted in 1822 provided: 139
"If the party be not found, a copy, served by the person leaving
the same, shall be left with his wife, or any free white person who
is a member of his or her family, at his or her dwelling-house or
usual place of abode ... and if, upon such second process, the party
be not found, a copy shall-be again left in like manner as is hereinbefore directed, and upon_ a second return, that the party is not
found, and that a copy has been left as herein directed, the same
proceedings may be had as on process returned executed."
Under this rule it was not necessary to find the defendant within the
district if he had a place of residence there at which he might be
served. Substituted service in the district bound the defendant wherever he might be.
·
182 1
133 1
134 1

Stat. L. 123.
Stat. L. 191.
Stat. L. 276.
1ss 4 Stat. L. 278.
13617 Stat. L. 197.
187 Warren, ''Federal Process and State Legislation," 16 VA. L. REv. 421_ at 435 (1930).
1sSibid.
1a0 7 Wheat. xvii.
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In Ex parte Graham (1818)140 a circuit court sitting in Rhode
Island, issued a writ in a prize case to the marshal of the District of
Pennsylvania directing him to attach the person of one Graham. Graham was attached, but was released by the Circuit Court o( Pennsylvania on habeas corpus, Justice Washington saying:
"It is admitted, that these Courts, in the exercise of their common law and equity jurisdiction, have no authority, generally, to
issue process into another District, except in cases where such
authority has been specially bestowed, by some law of the United
States. The absence of such a power would seem necessarily to
result from the organization of the Courts of the United States;
by which two Courts are allotted to each of the Districts, into
which the United States are divided; the one denominated a District-the other a Circuit Court.
"This division and appointment of particular Courts, for each
District, necessarily confines the jurisdiction of the local tribunals,
within the bounds of the respective Districts, within which they
are directed to be holden. Were it otherwise, and the Court of
one District, could send compulsory process into any other, so
as to draw to itself a jurisdiction over persons, or things, without
the limits of the District, there would result a clashing of jurisdiction between those Courts, which could not easily be adjusted;
and an oppression-upon suitors, too intolerable to be endured."
According to this opinion, which seems to have settled the point, a
federal court could not, under the act of 1792, by general rule or
otherwise, authorize the service of process outside the district in which
the court sat.
Alth~l].gh in actions at law a federal court was supposed to follow
the practice of the state in which it sat, it could not follow the state
practice to the extent of exercising jurisdiction over nonresidents of the
district not found therein. This point was _discussed at length in Pie~
quet v. Swan (1828).-1 41 After stating that he was in complete agreemerit with the opinion of his ''brother Washington" in Ex parte Graham, Justice Story said:
"The process acts of 1789, ch.21, and of 1792, ch.36, have
prescribed the forms of process, and modes of service, to be according to the state jurisprudence. But they do not appear to me to
be intended to enlarge the sphere of jurisdiction of the Circuit
Courts. Whenever the person is an inhabitant of, or found within,
140 3 Wash. Rep. 456.
141 5 Mason, C. C., 35,

47.
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the District, the proper writ may issue, and· the process may be
served against him, whether it be a capias, summons, attachment,
- or otherwise, as the local jurisprudence authorizes.... If the state
jurisprudence authorizes its own Courts to take cognizance of
suits against non-residents, by summoning their tenants, attornies,
or agents, or attaching their property, whether it be a farm or a
debt, or a glove, or a chip, it is not for us to say, that such legislation may not be rightful, and bind. the State Courts. But when
the Circuit Courts are called upon to adopt the same rule, it ought
to be seen, that Congress have, in an unambiguous manner, made
it imperative upon them."
The same position was taken by the Supreme Court in Toland '17.
Sprague (1838).142 In both cases it was pointed out that Congress
had specifically authorized service outside the district in only three
instances: (I) Act of 1.793 providing that subpoenas for witnesses
might "run into any other district" but not farther than 100 miles from ·
the place of trial.143 (2) Act of 1797 providing that "all writs of execution upon any judgment obtained for the use of the United States,
in any of the courts of the United States in one state, may run and be
executed in any other state, or in any of the territories of the United
States."144 (3) Act of 1826 providing that where a state had been di- '
vided into two federal districts, writs of execution might run and be
executed in any part of the state.145
A statute enacted in 1875 provided for service of notice outside the
district in suits "to enforce any legal or equitable lien upon or claim
to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to
real or personal property within the district" when one or more of the
defendants should not be an inhabitant of or found within the district.
"But said adjudication shall, as regards said absent defendant or defendants without appearance, affect only the property which shall
have been the subject of the suit and under the jurisdiction of the
court therein, within such district."146 The purpose of this statute was
to provide a uniform method of giving notice in actions in rem and
quasi in rem. Since it was necessary to bring such an action in the district in which the real or personal property was situated- so there could
be execution of th~ judgment, notice outside the district in person or
142 12 Peters (37 U.S.)
143 1 Stat.
335.
144 1 Stat. L. 515.
145 4 Stat. L. 184.
146 18 Stat. L. 472. ·

L:
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by publication or substituted service inside the district must be allowed if a nonresident of the district not found therein was to be given notice
of the action and an opportunity to defend. Under this statute it has
been necessary to distinguish carefully between actions in personam
and actions in rem or quasi in rem. This distinction is not the same
as that made between local and transitory actions. Some local actions
are in personam.
The territorial limits of effective service in actions in personam have
been extended in two ways: (I) where there are two or more federal
districts in one state, service may be made anywhere within the state.
(2) In a few types of c~es service may be made anywhere in the United
States. Rule 4 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) provides:
"All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides,
beyond the territorials limits of that state. A subpoena may be
served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45."
Prior to the adoption of this rule Congress had provided for service
anywhere within the state in a few situations.147 The new rule, according to the advisory committee which drafted it, "enlarges to some
extent" the prior rule as to where service might be had, but "does not
enlarge the jurisdiction" of the district courts. The few statutes which
authorize service beyond the limits of a state are "clearly expressed and
carefully guarded exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction in
personam."148 The following are found in Title 28 U.S.C. as revised
and re-enacted in 1948: (I) Process in a stockholder's action on behalf of a corporation may be served on such corporation in any district
where it is organized, licensed to do business, or is doing business.149
(2) Where a receiver is appointed for property situated in different
districts process may be executed in any such district.150 (3) In interpleader action process to claimants shall be addressed to and served by
United States marshals for districts in which claimants reside or may be
found.151 ( 4) In actions relating to orders of the Interstate Commerce
147 See supra, note 145. Also see report of advisory committee which drafted Federal
Rule 4(£).
148 Brandeis, J., in Robertson v. Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619 at 624, 45 S. Ct. 621
(1924).
149 Sec. 1695.
150 Id. §1692.
151 Id. §2361.

34

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

Commission, process may run, and be served, and be returnable anywhere in the United States.152 Similar provisions will be found in a
few acts such as- the Sherman Act (1890)1 53 and the Clayton Act

(1914).154
Looking back- over the developments since the adoption of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 we can see little change from the original view
thata fed~ral district is an independent civil-action territory. While we
are now willing to treat districts in one state much the same as one
territory, there has been little tendency to extend the territorial jurisdiction of a district court beyond the boundaries of the state.

C.

Choice of Place of Trial

The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided: "no civil suit shall be
brought ... against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ...."155 This
already narrow venue provision was immediately restricted further by
_reading it into the common law distinction between transitory and local
actions. 156 It was further restricted by the section which conferred
jurisdiction upon the circuit courts. These courts were given jurisdiction of: (I) suits by the United States, (2) suits to which an alien is a
party and (3) suits between "a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State." Taking into account these
restrictions the first rules governing venue in the federal courts can be
summarized as follows: (I) All local actions _must be commenced and
tried in the district in which the cause of action arose-ordinarily, where
the property involved is situated. (2) Actions by the United States
may be commenced and tried in the district in which the defendant
resides or in any district in which he is found. (3) Actions by aliens
may be commenced and tried in the district-in which the defendant
resides or in any district in which he is found. ( 4) Actions against
aliens may be commenced and tried in any district in- which the defendant is found. (5) Actions between citizens of different:states may

152 Id.

§2321.
Stat. L. 209, 210.
154 38 Stat. L. 730, 737.
155 l Stat. L. 79.
, 156 See Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch (IO U.S.) 148 (1810) (suit in equity in Kentucky to compel conveyance of land in Ohio), and Livingston v. Jefferson, l Brock. 203,
Fed. Case No. 8,411 (1811) (action at law in Virginia for trespass to land in New
Orleans).
158 26
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be commenced and tried in the district in which the defendant resides
or in any district in which he is found, provided the plaintiff or defendant is a citizen of the state "where the suit is brought."157
1.

Local actions

The familiar case of Livingston v. Jefferson (1811)158 was an
action by a citizen of New York against a citizen of Virginia in the circuit court for Virginia where the defendant resided. The action was
for trespass to land situated in New Orleans. The court had jurisdiction over the defendant sufficient for a judgment in personam, but
declined to take jurisdiction of the case because the land was situated
outside the district. Under the English common law the action was
local, not transitory. The court was aware that its decision meant that
most likely the plaintiff could not maintain his action at all. Chief
Justice Marshall said:
"It is worthy of observation, that the jurisdiction of the court
depends on the character of the parties, and that only the court of
that district in which the defendant resides, or is found, can take
jurisdiction of the cause. In a court so constituted, the argument
drawn from the total failure of justice, should a trespasser be
declared to be only amenable to the court of that district in which
the land lies, and in which he will neve~ be found, appeared to
me to be of peculiar weight."
Being in personam, the action had to be commenced in the district
in which the defendant resided or in a district in which he could be
found. Being local it had to be commenced where the land was situated. Unless process could run from the land to the defendant, or
. the defendant should go to the land, no action could be maintained.
Where the object of a local· action is to obtain a judgment in rem
or quasi in rem, no hardship arises because the action must be brought
in the district in which the property is situated.. Notice can be given
personally outside the district or by publication or substituted service inside the district. Where the object of a local action is to obtain
an in personam judgment, jurisdiction over the defendant must be obtained in the state in which the property involved is situated. If the
1117 Craig v. Cwnmins (1811) set out in note to Shute v. Davis, 1 Pet. C. C. 431,
Fed. Case No. 12,828 (1817). White v. Fenner, 1 Mason C. C. 520, Fed. Case No.
17,547 (1818), Kitchen v. Williamston, [Strawbridge] 4 Wash. C. C. 84, Fed. Case No.
7,854 (1821).
11181 Brock. C. C. 203, Fed. Case No. 8,411.
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property is in one state, and the defendant in another, no action can
be maintained. The only change from the original scheme of dealing
with local actions was made in 1858.159 At this time there was a partial extension from the boundaries of a district to the boundaries of a
state containing more than one district. The present statute reads: 160
"Any civil action, of a local nature, involving property located
in different districts in the same state, may be brought in any of
such districts."
Under Rule 4(£} process may be served "anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held."
~-

Transitory actions

Under the English common law a transitory action was one which
could be "laid" in any county, subject to the right of the defendant to
have the venue changed to the county in which the cause of action
wholly arose. Under the federal practice there is no transitory action
of the English type, but two kinds of local actions: (1) actions which
must be commenced and tried where the cause of action arose; ordinarily, where the property involved is situated, and (2) actions which
must be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or where he
may be found. Local actions of the first kind are the same as the local
actions of the English common law. Local actions of the second kind
were unknown to the common law, and, insofar as the federal courts
are concerned, were introduced by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
One of the chief problems involved in the establishment of a federal judicial system was pla~e of trial. Distances were great and means
of transportation poor. The people of Kentucky were threatening to
leave the Union if a federal system should be set up without a trial
court in their area.161 The Constitution had just provided that a
prosecution for crime must be in the state of the crime; and an amendment was being considered which woµld require trial by a jury "of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."162
One of the reasons for the separation of the colonies from England had
been threats to drag the colonists from their homes to stand trial at dis11 Stat. L. 272.
U .s.c. (1948) § 1392.
161 Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37
HA:av. L. RBv. 71 (1923).
159

160 28

162 Sixth

Amendment.
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tant places.163 To the people of 1789, place of trial was a matter of
great importance, and without safeguards for defendants a federal system of trial courts would not be acceptable.164
The early English rule that a civil action must be "laid" in the
county in which the cause of action arose was grounded at first on
necessity because of the jury. After this necessity disappeared the rule
was continued for local actions because the place thus provided was
ordinarily as convenient as any other which might be selected. The
rule had the virtue of not favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant.
If events involved in an action had occurred in a county it was fair
to try the action in that county. Witnesses, ordinarily, would be found
in the county and could attend court without great inconvenience. A
view by the jury could be had. While it is never possible to say in
advance what place will be convenient for the trial of a particular case,
if a general rule of convenience is to be made for all cases, the rule
requiring trial where the cause of action arose has very great merit.
By comparison, the rule adopted by the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
wholly irrational. That a person might reside in a certain district or
might be travelling through a certain district was not reason for saying
it would be convenient to try an action against him in that district.
The "statutory" local action created by the Judiciary Act of 1789
is concerned with the locality of the defendant in two respects, place of
his residence and place of his presence. Since the place of residence
of a natural person is his usual place of abode, there is, ordinarily, only
one such place. When place of trial is the place of the defendant's
residence, the plaintiff has no choice. When, however, the place of
trial may be any place where the defendant is served with process,
possibilities of choice multiply as the defendant travels outside his district. There is, however, at any given time only one place in which he
may be sued. Title 28 U.S.C. (1948) contains the following general
provisions: 165
"(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law,
be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all
defendants reside.
163 See

Blume, ''Place of Trial of Criminal Cases," 43
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164 Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37
H,uw. L. REv. 71 (1923).
165 Sec. 1391.
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"(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely
on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial
district where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided
bylaw.
"
"(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doin_g business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes.
·
"(cl) An alien may be sued in any district."
According to another section of the title, "any civil action, not of a
local nature, against defendants residing in different, districts in the
same State, may be brought in any of such districts."
(a) While it appears that the plaintiff is given a choice of place
of trial in a diversity case, that choice is affected by the rule which
limits the service of process. Unless the d!:!fendant can be served in
the plaintiff's district, the plaintiff must sue in the district in which the
defendant resides.
·
(b) In the non-diversity case the plaintiff has no choice. The
action must be in the district in which the defendant resides.
(c) That a corporation may be considered as present in more ·
than one place for service of process, and that it may be considered
as residing in more than one place for the purposes of venue, means
that the plaintiff in an action against a corporation has a choice of place
of trial as wide as the extent of the defendant's bu~iness.
(d) The provision that an alien may be ~sued in any district
means, of course, that he may be sued in any district in which he is
served with process. The possibilities of choice of place of trial de' pend on how widely the defendant travels. While this provision seems
to make an action against an alien more transitory than local, it must
. be remembered that a transitory action in England could be "faid" in
any county regardless of place. Here we must take into account the
place in which-the defendant is found. ·
Turning to the special venue provisions of Title 28 we find the
following places designated as places of trial: (I) place of residence
of plaintiff, (2) place of residence of defendant, (3) place in which
defendant is found, ( 4) place in which cause of action arose,· (5) place
in which subject of action is situated, (6) place in which prisoner is
detained, (7) place in which revenue return is filed, (8) place in whi~h
removable action is pending, (9) place of residence of defendant's·
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agent, and (IO) place in which defendant's agent is found. Some of
these provisions apply to only one type of case; others to three or four.
Some are exclusive; others, alternative. While there is some basis for
predicting that trial at four of the places designated ( 4, 5, 6 and 7)
would be convenient for all concerned, there is no basis for predicting
that trial at the other six places would be convenient for anyone.

D.

Change of Place of Trial

The Judiciary Act of 1789 contained no provision for change of
venue from one district to another. The plaintiff could make whatever choices he had without regard to convenience either of the defendant, of the witnesses, or of the court which must try the case. He
could, and _might for improper purposes, choose the most inconvenient
place, and nothing could be done.166 It should be noted, however,
that plaintiffs had but few opportunities to make choices. In England,
where a transitory action could be "laid" in any county at the option
of the plaintiff, there was a fully developed practice of changing venue
1n the interest of convenience of trial.
In more recent years, due largely to the developmeiit of large corporations which may be sued in many places, ·attention has been called
to the need for a rational basis for selecting the place of trial.· In the
"common law" local actions the place of trial is the place in which
the cause of action arose, and this identity of place promises some degree of convenience of trial. In the "statutory" local actions there is no
such identity of place. The mere fact that a person or corporation
resides in, or can be found in, a district, is no reason for trying an action
in that district. A new provision of Title 28 U.S.C. (1948) reads: 167
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought."
This provision is like a breath of fresh air in a musty room. At last,
after 160 years, a start has been made toward a rational scheme of
statutory venue. Much more, however, needs to be done. First, there
should be a return to the fundamental common law rule that an action
should be tried in the place in which the cause of action or a part thereof arose. The "common law" local action is grounded on this rule.
166 For a recent recognition of power to ·dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens,
see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947).
167 Sec. 1404.
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Second, and as part of the return to the common law, provision should
be made for service of process outside the district. Then, to make sure
the place selected by the plaintiff for the trial of a cause arising in more
than one place
the most convenient for all concerned, change of
venue should be provided. In the meantime, a liberal treatment of the
provision adopted in 1948.will greatly improve the present system.
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